{"id":70,"date":"2015-01-09T23:32:05","date_gmt":"2015-01-09T23:32:05","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/?p=70"},"modified":"2015-01-09T23:32:05","modified_gmt":"2015-01-09T23:32:05","slug":"philosophy-immanuel-kant-and-murder-mysteries-part-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/?p=70","title":{"rendered":"Philosophy, Immanuel Kant, and Murder Mysteries \u2013 Part 1"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>I suppose that the genesis of this post comes from one of my current study projects.\u00a0 Over the past several months, I\u2019ve been slowly working my way through Harry Gensler\u2019s really fine book \u2018An Introduction to Logic\u2019, 2<sup>nd<\/sup> edition.\u00a0 As is the case when I learn anything, I find that my mind automatically associates many things with many things.\u00a0 It seems to me a good strategy, because I remember the information much better and can apply it with greater ease.\u00a0 (This should be contrasted with the way I was taught or learned history \u2013 I still don\u2019t know what the Battle of Hastings was, why I should care, and how it affects my life.)<\/p>\n<p>Anyway, Chapter 3 of Gensler\u2019s book deals with definitions and what is essentially epistemology, although I don\u2019t believe that Gensler ever mentions that term explicitly. The most interesting part of that discussion is the presentation of the categories of definition attributed to Immanuel Kant and how they mesh with the two philosophical divisions of knowledge that are traditionally recognized.<\/p>\n<p>Kant divides definitions into two categories:<\/p>\n<div style=\"border: 1px solid black; text-align: left; background-color: #ff6666;\"><strong>Analytic statements:<\/strong> \u00a0 Statements whose subject contains its predicate or are self-contradictory to deny.<br \/>\n<strong> Synthetic statements:<\/strong> Statements that are neither analytic nor are self-contradictory.<\/div>\n<p>Traditionally, philosophers recognize two kinds of knowledge, which are defined as:<\/p>\n<div style=\"background-color: #ff6666; border: solid 1px black;\"><strong><em>A posteriori <\/em>knowledge<\/strong>: Empirical knowledge based on sense experience.<br \/>\n<strong><em>A priori<\/em> knowledge<\/strong>:\u00a0 Rational knowledge based solely on intellect.<\/div>\n<p>No doubt a few examples are in order to make these concepts clearer.\u00a0 The examples that Gensler provides (and which I believe an anonymous Wikipedia contributor lifted without attribution) tend to feature the noun \u2018bachelor\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>Examples of analytic and synthetic statements are:<\/p>\n<div style=\"border: 1px solid black; text-align: left; background-color: #ff6666;\">All bachelors are unmarried. (analytic)<br \/>\nDaniel is a bachelor. (synthetic)<\/div>\n<p>The first statement is analytic, since its subject \u2018bachelors\u2019 is synonymous with \u2018unmarried\u2019 (that is to say that its subject contains its predicate as an attribute), while the second statement is clearly synthetic, since the word \u2018Daniel\u2019 is not synonymous with \u2018bachelor\u2019, nor is it self-contradictory, as it would be if \u2018Daniel\u2019 were replaced by \u2018Stacey\u2019 (assuming the usual gender denotations of names).<\/p>\n<p>The following statements are examples of <em>a posteriori <\/em>and <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge:<\/p>\n<div style=\"border: 1px solid black; text-align: left; background-color: #ff6666;\">Some bachelors are happy. (a posteriori)<br \/>\nAll bachelors are unmarried. (<em>a priori<\/em>)<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The first piece of knowledge that \u2018some bachelors are happy\u2019 can only be obtained by us going out, meeting bachelors and determining (through whatever mechanism we like) that they are happy.\u00a0 The second bit of knowledge is based on our ability to see the essential definition of the word bachelor.<\/p>\n<p>Obviously, there is an extremely close tie between a statement being analytic and a piece of knowledge being <em>a priori<\/em>.\u00a0 There is also a very close tie between a synthetic statement and a piece of <em>a posteriori <\/em>knowledge (but, I would argue, not as close as the association between analytic and <em>a priori<\/em>).\u00a0 Thus, there is a tendency in philosophy to equate the two terms in each case, and to say that all statements of <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge are analytic, and that all statements of <em>a posteriori <\/em>knowledge are synthetic.<\/p>\n<p>This seems to be a natural conclusion, and one may dismiss the idea that some statements of <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge can be synthetic, or that some statements of <em>a posteriori <\/em>knowledge can be analytic. This dismissal is also supported, at least superficially, by the common notion that all of our mathematics is <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge and all of our science is based on <em>a posteriori <\/em>knowledge.<\/p>\n<p>The problem arises when one starts to examine certain statements that, while not quite self-referential, fall into a category where they at least talk about each other, or, more precisely, they are statements that explicitly talk about the nature of knowledge.<\/p>\n<p>As a possible example of an analytic statement of <em>a posteriori <\/em>knowledge, consider the sentence \u2018the value of pi is about 3% larger than 3\u2019.\u00a0 That there is a constant of proportionality between the diameter and the circumference of a circle is certainly an analytic statement of <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge, but the determination of the actual value (or some decimal approximation to it) is not.\u00a0 Okay, so maybe there is such a thing as an analytic statement of <em>a posteriori <\/em>knowledge, although Gensler leaves the door open for doubt when he says<\/p>\n<div style=\"border: 1px solid black; text-align: left; background-color: #ff6666;\">\u201cBut perhaps any analytic statement that is known <em>a posteriori <\/em>also could be known <em>a priori<\/em>\u201d<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>But, apparently, the real drama in the philosophical world (I must admit I have fanciful images of Plato and Aristotle, dressed in wrestling tights, as squaring off in a steel-cage match) is over whether there is credible evidence to support the claim of a synthetic statement of <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge.\u00a0 Such a statement Q would be one such that Q is neither self-contradictory to affirm nor to deny, Q is true, and we know Q to be true only using our reason.<\/p>\n<p>Trying to further explain where such a brain-twisting idea can arise, Gensler asks us to consider two types of philosophers: empiricists and rationalists.\u00a0 According to his discussion, the empiricist denies the possibility of synthetic <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge, while the rationalist admits such a possibility.\u00a0 The crux seems to come in the examination of the empiricist\u2019s point of view.\u00a0 The first observation is that an empirical point of view seems to equate the experiences of the senses with the actualities of the world.\u00a0 An empiricist is inclined to say something like<\/p>\n<div style=\"border: 1px solid black; text-align: left; background-color: #ff6666;\">\u201cI perceive an object to be red, therefore it is a red object.\u201d<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Of course the empiricist seems to have no mechanism for embracing the idea that an object is actually red when it is perceived as red, except to resort to what seems to be synthetic <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge.\u00a0 It is synthetic because nothing in how the terms are defined requires an object that is perceived as red to actually be red.\u00a0 It is <em>a priori<\/em> because we use our reason to conclude that it is a tenable assumption that all objects perceived as red are, indeed, red.<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps even more interesting is the position the empiricist takes on synthetic <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge in the first place.\u00a0 To say<\/p>\n<div style=\"border: 1px solid black; text-align: left; background-color: #ff6666;\">\u201cThere is no such thing as synthetic <em>a priori<\/em> knowledge\u201d<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>seems to be an example of synthetic a priori knowledge, at least in-so-far as one is willing to agree that the statement, if true, is not true by virtue of the definition of the terms \u2018synthetic\u2019 and \u2018<em>a priori<\/em>\u2019, and is therefore synthetic, and that the statement, if true, cannot be determined to be so by our sense experiences, and so it must be <em>a priori<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Okay, so what does any of this have to do with murder mysteries?\u00a0 Well, as I mentioned above, whenever I am learning something, I employ a personal strategy of associating things I understand with things I am trying to grasp.\u00a0 As I was reading Genler\u2019s presentation, I couldn\u2019t help but wonder how mystery writers employ these points to amuse, entertain, and sometimes baffle us.<\/p>\n<p>So, next time, I will apply some of these concepts to some of the world\u2019s most famous fictional detectives.\u00a0 We\u2019ll have a chance to see if Sherlock Holmes is synthetic or analytic.\u00a0 We\u2019ll ask how many of Hercule Poirot\u2019s little gray cell depend on <em>a priori<\/em> versus <em>a posteriori <\/em>knowledge.\u00a0 We\u2019ll examine whether Miss Marple&#8217;s understanding of human nature springs from analytic <em>a posteriori <\/em>knowledge.\u00a0 And we\u2019ll explore how logic, reason, and epistemology figure into two of the twentieth century&#8217;s most philosophical writers, G.K. Chesteron and Umberto Eco, through their excellent characters of Father Brown and Brother William of Baskerville.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>I suppose that the genesis of this post comes from one of my current study projects.\u00a0 Over the past several months, I\u2019ve been slowly working my way through Harry Gensler\u2019s&#8230; <a class=\"read-more-button\" href=\"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/?p=70\">Read more &gt;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-70","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=70"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=70"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=70"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aristotle2digital.blogwyrm.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=70"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}